Introduction
In the United States, Canada and Europe, courts generally approach the question of religious accommodations using a three-prong analysis. First, the sincerity of the claimant has to be established. Second, the substantiality of the burden or interference engendered by the law or regulation on the religious believer has to be assessed. And finally, there is often some kind of proportionality test to justify the burden with the government interest in order to ensure that the law or regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving or advancing that interest. The precise form and weight accorded to each prong varies across jurisdictions, 1 there is less discussion on the other parts of this framework, much less on how courts should assess the substantiality of a burden.
A recent spate of both decided and pending cases in various jurisdictions however is beginning to place this question front and center. In some cases, the presence of a burden seems clear. For instance, in 2016, the ECtHR held the rejection of a permit for applicants to use an apartment as a place of worship to be interference as this rendered the members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses religious community unable to practice their religion. 4 But in some cases, it is not as clear. In Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed the contraceptive mandate under the regulations promulgated by the Human and Health Services department to be a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the individual owners of the closely held corporation Hobby Lobby. 5 In particular, the owners were concerned that providing full coverage would force them to facilitate wrongdoing by employees who might use the insurance to purchase forms of contraception, despite the charge of the critics that the claim seems too attenuated to merit protection. The court deferred to the claims of the petitioners in determining whether the burden was substantial enough to trigger the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and based its decision on the result of the proportionality analysis.
Part of the difficulty has to do with conceptualizing what is a burden. In theory, any government action that impacts religious exercise, whether directly or indirectly, is a burden. For example, a mandatory voting law would be objectionable and deemed burdensome to someone whose religious beliefs require abstention from politics. Accordingly, accommodations analysis mandates an assessment of whether the imposed burden is serious or substantial. Courts from different jurisdictions have similar approaches despite differences in nomenclature. Before the Supreme Court of Canada, it is required that the infringement on religious exercise be deemed "non-trivial." 6 To illustrate, a requirement that all driver's license photos show the entire face without any head covering is deemed a non-trivial infringement to a member of a Hutterite community woman who believes that such practice is objectionable according to the dictates of her faith. 7 In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), implicit in its assessment that "interference" is present in the exercise of rights secured by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is the requirement that it be not de minimis though ECtHR case law on this tends to subject practices under scrutiny less in recognizing interference compared to its American counterpart. 8 In a recent decision, the court's judgment did take into account the small amount of monetary impact on a Mormon church. This paper is set against the background of this ongoing discussion in courts and within the legal academy. It suggests that there is not a single conception, but a variety of burdens that courts have to take into account in order provide some insights as to how substantiality can be assessed.
It outlines three possible conceptions of burden, namely 1) burden as coercion; 2) burden as impact; and 3) burden as ratification, and it evaluates each with respect to the central values underlying religious accommodations. Disaggregating burden in this way expands our frames of understanding and allows courts to make better sense of the claims before them. Israel L. Rev. 49, 67 (2017) ("In section 2(a) religious accommodation cases, the courts have been quick to find a breach of the right. Any non-trivial restriction on a religious practice will amount to a breach of the section.") The SCC might be quick to find restriction but only when it comes to one particular type of burden.
view, 12 that is, to understand religion and its significance from the perspective of religious believers, when weighing accommodation claims. This would inevitably require that any evaluation of burden would have to take into account the system of beliefs from which these perceived burdens emanate. 13 Although that would understandably raise questions as to the propriety of courts evaluating theological issues, 14 it is probably unavoidable to a certain extent.
To understand how a law impairs a practice presupposes an understanding of what is important and religiously significant about the practice. In many cases, courts already do this with respect to the assessment of sincerity despite protestations to the contrary.
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This article undertakes a holistic examination of various kinds of cases before three high courts -American, Canadian and the European Court of Human Rights -in order to give us a sense of the type of claims found along this spectrum. Given the similarities found in the tests articulated by these courts, the suggestion in this paper provides some much-needed guidance that could prove to be workable across jurisdictions. To reiterate, acknowledging that religious believers confront different kinds of burdens does not relieve courts of the responsibility to assess whether these are indeed substantial enough to merit further balancing with legitimate government objectives. It does however go a long way into addressing the gaps that exist in current religionrelated case law in the jurisdictions under consideration, the foremost of which is to take religion a lot more seriously than is currently done. Before one can assess the gravity of a claim, the court has to find an a priori burden. when they lose, it should not be because the court has found they were not deemed to be burdened in the first place.
II. The Role of Burden in Accommodations Analysis

Justifying Religious Accommodations
That a select number of individuals and institutions could be exempted from generally applicable laws or regulations on account of their religious beliefs is long considered to be a self- It should be noted at this point that all these justifications could very well be claimed on behalf of a non-religious viewpoint, and while that is true, it is liberty of religious conscience that is the subject of this discussion. Whether that is an anachronistic take or not, given the dramatic change in contemporary religious demographics, the morality of treating religion as special in this respect will not be addressed in this paper. In any case, the ECtHR has adopted a more capacious view of beliefs and as such, of all kinds contrary to the restrictive approach taken by national courts in the United States and Canada.
As mentioned earlier, these values inform all parts of the test most courts use to determine whether to grant an accommodation. These tests, while differing in structure, often require the sincerity of the believer, an infringement or interference by the State, and some kind of proportionality or balancing test. As a reflection of the bifurcated structure of fundamental rights adjudication in general, this framework not only flows from the non-absolute nature of these rights but also functions as a structure through which burdens of proof are distributed. "should be prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." This stage focuses on, and safeguards the substance as well as the means by which the state protects the general welfare.
The Evolution of Burden
Between the sincerity requirement and the justification stage stands burden. Burden - and that the claimants in this case cannot give precedence to their religious beliefs and impose them on others. In these foregoing cases, there is no need to consider burden as part of the legal analysis for as long as the state can advance a legitimate objective. From a rights-protective stance, To be sure, this was a significant upgrade compared to the non-existent balance struck by the Reynolds/Cantwell line of cases, as it at least took into account the possibility that religion might be constitutionally burdened, even if only under a very narrow set of circumstances.
Moreover, it also presented a set of guidelines as to how to reach the constitutional threshold of burden. In Sherbert v. Verner, the case that inaugurated the birth of the compelling interest test, the court recognized that the statutory denial of unemployment benefits due to Sherbert's dismissal from work on account of her religious beliefs, as imposing a constitutionally cognizable burden.
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It also gave a clue as to an incipient understanding of burden as coercion since the court pointed out that the denial of benefits essentially forced her to choose between following the dictates of her religion on the one hand, and forfeiting benefits, on the other. 42 Putting a believer into this kind of dilemma essentially amounted to the same kind of burden as would a direct fine against religious worship. As such, because of the presence of this burden, the government then had to show a compelling, paramount interest in the enforcement of the statute. The burden requirement was not spelled out with clarity, and it would only emerge as a full-fledged threshold doctrine more than twenty years later in Roy and Lyng but this was a considerable advance from the simplistic distinction made in Reynolds.
As these early American cases illustrate, the emergence of burden as a legal threshold, largely served the interests of religious believers, or at least some of them. It gave claimants an opportunity to prove that their claims were worthy of constitutional protection and under certain circumstances, override a compelling government interest, by providing for a place in the doctrinal framework where claims of gravity can be asserted. Burden renders religion and all its intricacies 41 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1963) ("We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes on any burden on the free exercise of the appellant's religion. We think it is clear that it does.") 42 Id. at 404.
visible. It is no accident that the evolution of burden coincided with the rise to prominence of religious accommodations as part of, and indeed, according to some scholars, even required by a constitutional commitment to freedom of religion. 43 In the European context, burden or interference followed a similar trajectory. Prior to its 2013 decision in Eweida v. United Kingdom, 44 the ECtHR has seldom engaged with any indirect interference claims under Article 9.
For instance, in a series of rulings involving "a right to resign," the court held that the opportunity to seek employment elsewhere was an adequate form of protection in cases of a clash between workplace regulations and religious beliefs. 45 In a non-employment related case, the ECtHR ruled that a refusal to grant approval for a religious organization to conduct their own ritual slaughter was not interference within the scope of Article 9 on the grounds that there was another licensed slaughterer in the area and it did not make it impossible for ultra-Orthodox Jews to eat meat slaughtered in accordance with their religious prescriptions. 46 with early American and European case law, the SCC seems to have recognized dimensions of burden beyond direct coercion at the outset when it adopted an effects-based approach towards the rights enumerated under the Charter, and hence, even the presence of a generally applicable law as was the case in Bowen/Lyng would not prevent consideration of the impact of the regulation on the exercise of religion.
The Gravity of Burden
The foregoing discussion shows the difficulty of defining the contours of burden as a legal threshold. It also says little about the further qualification regarding its gravity. In Alberta v. government to condition his access to benefits or services on the use of this number, this can be considered a burden on religion and still not be substantial enough to merit justification. It is thus entirely conceivable for a court to do any of the following: 1) identify a burden, consider it substantial and then the claimant loses at the justification stage because the interest of the state is compelling or that it was not the least restrictive means to achieve that interest; or 2) identify a burden, consider it non-substantial and then forego the justification stage entirely, in which case the claimant also loses; 3) identify a burden, consider it substantial and then the claimant wins at the justification stage. It is important that burden is distinctively identified because it performs a procedural and substantive function. As the late Robert Cover notes in his classic article Nomos and Narrative, an invasion of the nomos of insular communities deserve to be treated with a commitment as fundamental as that of the majority community's. 57 It is part and parcel of recognizing the value of pluralism in a society committed to liberal democratic ideals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, that recognition is done not at the level of respecting a believer's sincerity but at the level of acknowledging burden. To believe someone or some group is sincere is to acknowledge the autonomy of individuals and communities to choose their beliefs, whether religious or not. To recognize burden is to acknowledge the normative pull of those beliefs.
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Burden thus speaks to the actual conflict that results from the application of the law or regulation to the believer's observance of his or her religion. Religious beliefs, after all, are not products of mere choice. Indeed, the Lyng decision met a huge amount of criticism precisely for its dismissive approach to the Native American way of life. and substantial/non-substantial burdens is a difficult exercise but it is far from impossible; courts are engaged in line-drawing most of the time.
In addition, these proposals also assume a singular conception of burden -one which is largely defined by coercion. It seems prudent then t courts to imagine several conceptions of burden, especially as we broaden the milieu beyond the American context involving the First Amendment and the RFRA, and more importantly, beyond mainstream religions. For instance, in the case of Ktunaxa v. British Columbia, currently pending before the Supreme Court of Canada, the question is whether the claim that the construction of a ski resort, including permanent overnight accommodation, on a mountain deemed sacred by aboriginal peoples will cause the Great Spirit Bear to leave the area and thus render all their religious activities meaningless, is covered by the freedom of religion guarantee in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As in Lyng, the set of facts does not lend itself to easy analysis within the existing doctrinal framework. There is no coercion involved and the SCC could easily be at a loss as to how to evaluate such claim using the "non-trivial infringement" criteria.
Thus, widening our frame of understanding as to encompass the varieties of burden that religious believers and communities routinely encounter could help courts in recalibrating the weight put on each prong of their respective religious accommodations regimes. In keeping with the place of burden in accommodation, a partially subjective view of burden mandates that the claimants should be able to assert what they consider to be a burden on their own religious beliefs but at the same time, it is also a duty of the court to determine if there has been some kind of pressure induced by the government. 59 This solves the conundrum of courts not getting into the 59 Flanders, supra note 56.
business of defining people's religious commitments for themselves and likewise illustrates the close link between sincerity and burden.
III. Burden as Coercion
The paradigmatic example of burden is one of coercion. This is borne by the history of religious liberty which is replete with extreme examples of state-sponsored physical coercion involving persecution, torture and even death for religious dissenters. Out of this long history have come philosophical tracts that have formed the conceptual underpinnings of how we understand religious freedom in the present. Today, there is still no shortage of these forms of persecution in many parts around the world. 60 On the less extreme end of the spectrum, however, lie dilemmas that involve imprisonment, 61 fines, 62 denial of benefits, 63 and even seizures of property, 64 as equally unpalatable alternatives. More recently, this type of burden is also envisioned in most conscientious objection legislation involving health care.
In all these cases, the believer is put to a stark choice: either comply with the law or incur a cost. Commentators usually disaggregate cost into two categories, namely religious cost and secular cost. Religious cost pertains to the psychic damage -often a reflection of the degree of religious conviction -that the claimant will feel if he/she is forced to comply with the law or regulation that goes against the dictate of his/her faith. to claims of rational evidence. Like claims made under the sincerity prong of religious accommodation frameworks, this is correctly shielded from judicial scrutiny by virtue of the religious question doctrine or its analog which disables courts from passing judgment on any issue that involves theology. 66 For example, in Amselem, the claimant wanted to be able to erect his own personal succah to celebrate the Jewish holiday of Sukkot contrary to the building code which only allowed for the construction of a communal one. The SCC pointed out that the infringement on the right to freedom of religion was more than trivial because "the alternatives of either imposing on friends and family or celebrating in a communal succah…will subjectively lead to extreme distress and thus impermissibly detract from the joyous celebration of the holiday." 67 While the sentiment is commendable, this statement is rather problematic because whether or not this practice is indeed emotionally and psychologically onerous is not a judgment that a court should feel readily competent to make. In practice though, courts are, and rightfully so, generally deferential with respect to the asserted religious cost of a religiously-motivated practice.
A secular cost, on the other hand, refers to the actual, objective effect on the claimant who is being essentially forced to choose. 
IV. Burden as Impact
Another way of understanding burden is one of impact. This arose from and is largely based on Justice William Brennan's dissent in Lyng and is directed towards religious beliefs and practices that do not quite fit within a coercion-based framework, the principle example of which is the protection of sacred sites. This is certainly not only limited to indigenous peoples' religious practices although principally applicable to them as most of their sacred lands are often public property. Churches and mosques are more than likely to be privately owned and can be protected under the rubric of other rights such as property rights.
Remember that in Lyng the Supreme Court acknowledged that the proposed road construction would virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion but ruled anyway that "incidental effects of government programs which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs…" 70 cannot require the government to offer a compelling interest argument. In his scathing dissent, Justice Brennan forcefully argued against the court's emphasis on the form, rather than on the adverse effect, of government regulations. Note that the decision in Lyng came about notwithstanding the existence of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRF), 71 which, in theory, is intended to protect all aspects of Native American spirituality, including traditional religious rites and cultural practices. More recently, the Lyng reasoning was repeated in Navajo Nation v. US Forest Service, 72 which involved a claim by Indian tribe members that the use of recycled wastewater to make artificial snow for skiing on the Snowbowl, an area that covers a part of the San Francisco Peaks located in northern Arizona, will spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious exercise. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim, and remarked that "there is nothing to distinguish the road-building project in Lyng from the use of recycled wastewater on the Peaks." 73 Accordingly, no burden in Lyng also meant no burden in Navajo Nation. The court noted that the "only effect" of the upgrades would be on the subjective and emotional religious experience of the Navajos. 74 It characterized existing Supreme Court precedent as mandating that the diminishment of spiritual fulfillment could not be considered as a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This type of reasoning, as problematic in 2008
as it was twenty years prior, animates this present effort to clarify the variety of burdens that religious believers face for the sake of a more reasonable accommodations regime. claims. 79 In Canada, the anticipation directed towards the SCC's resolution of the Ktunaxa case is partially due to the lack of any applicable framework within which to evaluate claims relating to aboriginal spirituality. Indeed, the Court of Appeal decision did not even explicitly state whether the construction of the resort amounted to an infringement, and whether, in turn, such infringement or interference was trivial or not. 80 The decision did mention that the construction implicates the vitality of the Ktunaxa spiritual community but it did so without making a pronouncement on its implications. After the Canadian Charter came into existence in 1982, there have been few cases which involved aboriginal claims of religious freedom, and in those instances, the high court resolved them by recourse to aboriginal-specific legal doctrines, such as treaty rights, rather than through a general rights framework. 81 For example, in R v. Sioui, a Huron band of aboriginal persons were convicted by a court for cutting down trees, camping and making fires in an unauthorized area of a park located outside the Indian reserve. The band claimed that these activities were in performance of ancestral customs and religious rites. 82 The SCC struck down their criminal convictions on the ground that these activities were covered by a treaty agreed to between the Hurons and Britain in 1760, which is in turn, protected by a statute. Whether or not aboriginal spirituality is better off protected by a regime distinct from that of a bill or charter of rights applicable to everyone else is a matter of debate. But that should be an available choice in the first place.
This conception can also be useful in non-indigenous contexts although, it is and presumably will be, invoked far less frequently. Commission could have acknowledged the presence of an interference if only to recognize the importance of freedom of religion, even as it concludes that the interference is justified in the interest of public order.
V. Burden as Ratification
A third understanding of burden is one of ratification. religious sisters likewise argued that filling out a form in which they register their religious objections and which would prompt a third-party to provide coverage instead, would do the same. 91 Caroline Mala Corbin argues for example that the belief of these non-profit organizations that they are complicit in the sin of contraception rests on the mistaken assumption that it is their written refusal which triggered the provision of contraception. 92 In Canada, a similar situation arose recently in the aftermath of the SCC's decriminalization of assisted dying when a group of Christian medical professionals challenged the policy of the Ontario College of Physicians which requires doctors to perform an "effective referral" in cases of conscientious objections. 93 These professionals argued that the mandatory referral policy made it a moral equivalent of providing the procedure themselves. 94 This situation can be distinguished from cases of direct conscientious objection where the burden involved is properly considered to be one of coercion, not ratification. To be clear, the foregoing categories are not necessarily stand-alone categories nor are they exclusive. It is entirely plausible that a burden though primarily one typified by coercion, would necessarily involve some impact or ratification and vice-versa. These categories are used mainly to introduce some analytical clarity in this muddled area.
How Substantial a Burden?
Thus far the argument in this paper turns the conventional wisdom on its head, that is, by suggesting that it turns on the claimant to argue whether there is a burden in the first place (at least any of the three kinds proposed here), taking into account the centrality and importance of one's religious beliefs, before putting the onus on the court to ascertain its substantiality. 102 The search for a limiting principle still remains however. As other scholars have correctly argued, believers
should not be entitled to complete deference on whether a burden is substantial or not. 103 The foregoing discussion on the varieties of burden affords courts some clarity in determining what is a burden without changing that. Thus, in the Ktunaxa case, the recognition that the construction of permanent human accommodation on a sacred mountain posed a legally cognizable infringement on the beliefs would still require the SCC to evaluate whether such infringement is non-trivial.
Acknowledging that there is a burden on the Little Sisters of the Poor or the University of Notre Dame when they refuse to sign the necessary paperwork to trigger the third-party process that provides contraceptive coverage for their employees does not prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from determining whether that is substantial enough in order to shift the burden to the government to justify its compelling interest.
Obliging courts to evaluate the substantiality of a claimed burden not only serves rule-oflaw concerns, but given the capacious view of burden suggested by this paper, it would also help 102 Cf. Flanders, Insubstantial Burdens, supra note 56 at 13. ("I am willing to defer to the plaintiff as to whether a burden on her religion is "substantial." I am not willing to defer to the plaintiff as to whether there is a burden at all.") Flanders' position echoes many scholars writing in this field. 103 Gedicks, supra note 51; Efland, supra note 54; Corbin, supra note 92.
in limiting the number of claims that can be put forward. But how should a court assess substantiality? Fortunately, this is not uncharted territory. In a case involving parents' objections to having their children participate in a mandatory Ethics and Religious Culture program as it infringed on their right to pass their faith on to their children, the SCC articulated an additional requirement of proving interference from an objective standpoint, that is, "proving infringement requires an objective analysis of the rules, events or acts that interfere with the exercise of the freedom." 104 As with American scholars currently grappling with this issue, the court likewise held a similar concern then. To rule otherwise would allow persons to conclude themselves that their rights had been infringed and thus to supplant the courts in their role. 105 This objective dimension of the evaluation of burden closely tracks Michael Helfand's suggestion to consider the civil penalties for non-compliance as well as that of Paul Billingham's suggestion that "courts should determine the extent of the burden on a religious practice by using an impartial theory of individual interests to determine the cost that the individual bears" upon compliance. 106 The main difference between Helfand's account and the one described in this article is that Helfand combines substantiality with the presence of burden, which under some circumstances, leads to the unfortunate result of conflating money with principles. 107 Under the account proposed in this paper, the evaluation of the monetary penalty (assuming there is one) would only come after the court has already determined burden. For example, in the Hobby Lobby case, the Supreme Court could recognize the burden suffered by the claimants as one that involves an unacceptable ratification of what the HHS mandate leads to, which in their view, is one of abortion, and at the same time, assess whether the accompanying daily fine of two thousand dollars a day would be substantial enough to make that burden meet the essential threshold under the RFRA. In the Canadian context, the SCC could conceivably recognize the burden on the Ktunaxa First Nation community as a result of the desecration of what they deem to be sacred ground, and given that the main source of the community spirituality will be completely eradicated, it could evaluate and conclude that this is clearly a non-trivial infringement. In both cases, there is an additional step of weighing these against the countervailing interests of the state, which is beyond the current scope of the paper. But some questions that can be presumably raised include: as the US Supreme Court ultimately ruled, whether the contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means of achieving the objective of advancing public health and particularly women's health care. In the Ktunaxa case, the question would be whether the countervailing interest of allowing commercial development on the mountain is more important. Taking burden seriously in the manner proposed here would do away with the "meaningful choice" standard that was invoked in the SCC cases of Hutterian Brethren and R v. NS 108 (involving the question of whether a witness could be required to remove her niqab when testifying in court) in the same way that the Eweida case shifted the trajectory of ECtHR Article 9 case law by departing from the "right to resign" rule, that is, there is no interference when a person voluntarily accepts a position where limits are placed on the free exercise of religious beliefs or where an employee is free to leave his or her employment to continue following his or her religious observances. In all likelihood, courts would still consider these factors but at least it would so in the context of balancing competing claims, and not use 108 2012 SCC 72. Note that in the Hutterian case the SCC reasoned that the Hutterites had a meaningful alternative of hiring others to drive for them (since they will not be able to obtain driver's licenses without subjecting themselves to the photo requirement)
Page 35 of 35 them as another basis to dismiss outright any claims of burden, which, in turn, would preclude any further justification on the part of the government.
Ultimately, it is up to the court to decide and weigh the importance of the interests involved, but it should do so with a proper recognition of those interests. There are always understandable concerns about the propriety of courts entering the thicket of religion-related matters 109 but a reasonable religious accommodations regime is not realistic without the courts' involvement on each step of it.
VI. Conclusion
Balancing constitutionally-protected religious rights with legitimate policy objectives is far from a straightforward exercise. At the moment, courts have largely clung to restrictive interpretations of what constitutes a burden, which do not necessarily map onto the myriad claims that believers inevitably encounter in their daily lives. This leads to unfortunate results and makes short shrift of the constitutional promise to celebrate pluralism and its guarantee to protect religious liberty. While there is much room for further analysis to clarify how the proposal in this paper would work in practice given the complexity of these types of cases, the legal recognition of how believers experience religion and attempts by the state to restrict these practices in the name of a higher goal, would go a long way in crafting a fair and clear accommodations regime.
